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TRANSLATION
The three Graces,  
or the allegory of the gift
A contribution to the history of an idea  
in anthropology
Denis Vidal, Université Paris Diderot
 Translated by Eléonore Rimbault
Marcel Mauss’ The gift is one of the most revered texts of social anthropology. It is also one 
of the most debated. But, paradoxically enough, these debates have not focused on the main 
cultural tradition to which the famous essay may be attached. In this article, I attempt to show 
that Mauss’ anthropological theorization of the gift perpetuates and slightly modifies a very 
ancient tradition of reflection, fundamentally based on a few concepts—charis, gratia, and 
grace—all of which played a crucial role in European cultural history. This article also reveals 
the specific function played in this context by the allegory and iconography of the three Graces. 
Keywords: Three Graces, allegory of the gift, Mauss, gratia, charis, Seneca, Chrysippus, 
Lévi-Strauss
 Why are there three Graces and why are they sisters? Why do they hold hands? 
 Why are they smiling, youthful, virginal, wearing a loose and transparent dress?
 —Seneca, On benefits1
Publisher’s note: This article is a translation of Vidal, Denis. 1991. “Les trois Grâces ou 
l’allégorie du don: Contribution à l’histoire d’une idée en anthropologie,” Gradhiva 9: 
30–47.
1. Translated from the French edition of Seneca, Des bienfaits (1961: 7), as cited by Denis 
Vidal in the original version of this article. Our choice to not use the 2011 English 
translation for this epigraph results from the rhetorical features of the French trans-
lation, which offer “a series of questions” as a translation of the Latin passage. The 
English translation of the same passage (see Seneca 2011: 20) is not rendered in the 
same interrogative voice.—Trans. 
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As we learn from eminent scholars, art historians, students of antiquity, archaeolo-
gists, and philologists, the signification of the allegory of the three Graces has been 
known since Seneca. Seneca had found its meaning in Chrysippus, who certainly 
knew it from Hecaton. And it is not impossible that Chrysippus had himself taken 
this allegory from Epicurus. It is, in any case, a plausible hypothesis according to 
Edgar Wind, knowing, as Diogenes Laertius reports, that Carneades did not hesi-
tate to call Chrysippus a “literary parasite of Epicure,” because he wrote on every 
topic that the latter had dealt with before him (Wind 1958: 34–35). Anyone who 
has, even absent-mindedly, read Marcel Mauss’ The gift will, by reading the per-
sisting interpretation of the allegory of the three Graces, feel a strange sense of 
familiarity—a sense of déjà lu not necessarily stemming from a flawless knowledge 
of classical authors. Allow me to quote in full the answers Seneca gives to the series 
of questions I have just reported:
Some people advance the view that one of them stands for giving a 
benefit, one for receiving it, and one for returning it. Others hold that 
they represent three kinds of benefactors: those who confer benefits, 
those who return them, and those who accept “benefits” and return them 
at the same time. But no matter which of these interpretations you decide 
is true, what good does this specialized knowledge do for us? And what 
about the fact that the group dances in a circle with intertwined hands? It 
is because a gift (or “benefit”) goes through an orderly sequence, passing 
from hand to hand and yet returning to the giver, and loses its integral 
character if the sequence is at any point broken, being most beautiful if 
the continuity is maintained? In the dance, though, the older sister has 
a greater value, like those who confer “benefits.” The Graces have joyful 
expressions, just as those who give and receive benefits generally do. They 
are youthful because the remembrance of “benefits” should not grow old. 
They are virginal because benefits are unspoiled, pure, and revered by all. 
Benefits should not be constrained or obligated—that is why the Graces 
wear loose robes. And the robes are translucent because benefits want to 
be in full view. (Seneca 2011: lines 20–21) 
It is difficult to find a better illustration and a clearer explanation of Mauss’ theories 
of the gift. But that is also why it is surprising to note the absence of any refer-
ence to Seneca in general (and to this text in particular)—not only in The gift, but 
also, it seems, in all his published work.2 It is especially startling if one considers 
the imposing collection of references, particularly those in Greek and Latin, that 
Mauss used to support his work, as well as the deep familiarity many of his closest 
collaborators had with classical literature (e.g., Huvelin,3 Davy,4 and many others). 
2. Seneca is not cited once in the exhaustive name index of the complete works of Marcel 
Mauss published by Les Éditions de Minuit in France.
3. Paul Huvelin (1873–1924) was a legal historian and contributor to Émile Durkheim’s 
L’ Année Sociologique. He taught Roman law at the University of Lyon, and notably wrote 
a famous thesis, “Droit individuel et magie,” exploring the relation between magic and 
the law. 
4. Georges Ambroise Davy (1883–1976) was a French legal sociologist and, like Huvelin, 
a contributor to L’ Année Sociologique. He was a close disciple of Marcel Mauss. 
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This is all the more curious considering that in the numerous commentaries 
that followed The gift, scholars agreed almost unanimously on one point: the dis-
crepancy between the quality of the intuitions expressed in the text and the less 
convincing character of some the demonstrations (based on ethnographic facts) 
included in it. Students of Oceania, such as Raymond Firth and Marshall Sahlins, 
raised this criticism concerning Mauss’ interpretation of the hau, a Polynesian cat-
egory quite central to his argument on the gift (Firth [1901] 1965; Sahlins [1972] 
2004; Boyer 1986). The perception of this discrepancy has led some of Mauss’ com-
mentators to criticize him, others to see in it further evidence of his perspicacity, 
but it seems that very few of them questioned the origins of his intuitions. One may 
reconsider, from this perspective, the meaning of Lévi-Strauss’ famous observa-
tion about The gift in his Introduction to the work of Marcel Mauss ([1950] 1987: 
47): “Are we not dealing with a mystification, an effect quite often produced in the 
minds of ethnographers by indigenous people? Not, of course, by ‘indigenous peo-
ple’ in general, since no such beings exist, but by a given indigenous group, about 
whom specialists gave already pondered problems, asked questions and attempted 
answers.” Lévi-Strauss continues, explaining that 
we may infer that Mauss is seized by hesitation and scruples at the most 
crucial moment. He is no longer quite sure whether he must draw a 
picture of indigenous theory, or construct a theory of indigenous reality. 
He is very largely right to be unsure, for indigenous theory is much more 
directly related to indigenous reality than a theory developed from our 
own categories or problems would be. So it was a very great progress, 
at the time when Mauss was writing, to approach an ethnographic 
problem from the starting point of his New Zealand or Melanesian 
theory, rather than to call upon Western notions such as animism, myth 
or participation. But indigenous or Western, theory is only ever a theory. 
At best, it offers us a path of access, for, whether they be Fuegians or 
Australian Aboriginals, the interested parties’ beliefs are always far 
removed from what they actually think or do. Once the indigenous 
conception has been isolated, it must be reduced by an objective critique 
so as to reach the underlying reality. We have very little chance of finding 
that reality in conscious formulations, a better chance, in unconscious 
mental structures to which institutions give us access, but a better chance 
yet, in language. (Lévi-Strauss [1950] 1987: 48–49)  
One may suspect, however, that Lévi-Strauss, too, was seized by hesitation and 
scruples at the most crucial moment while analyzing the work of his predecessor. 
Is he not affirming, for example, in a most magisterial manner that “indigenous or 
Western, theory is only ever a theory”? But, in the particular case of Marcel Mauss, 
as I will attempt to demonstrate here, this sentence should be reformulated more 
accurately in the following way: “Western or Western, theory is only ever a theory.” 
The progress of logic could have given rise to the suspicion that the issue deserved 
further consideration. Unfortunately, this is where Lévi-Strauss, in his exegesis of 
Mauss’ work, seems to abandon the application of his own analytical principles 
and neglect their implications. Once Mauss’ conception had been defined, like that 
of any “indigenous people,” “it [had to] be reduced by an objective critique so as 
to reach the underlying reality. We have very little chance of finding that reality 
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in conscious formulations, a better chance, in unconscious mental structures to 
which institutions give us access, but a better chance yet, in language.” (ibid.) Lévi-
Strauss was probably right when thinking that Mauss had been “mystified” by in-
digenous people. But by identifying the “indigenous” people as Māori, he ran the 
risk of being mystified at once by a native and as a native. In line with Mauss and 
Lévi-Strauss, let us see now if we can catch sight of the “many moons that are dead, 
or pale, or obscure” (ibid.: 66). 
Connections
The short passage in Seneca, which we previously cited, combines several ele-
ments that can be briefly enumerated. It primarily discusses two notions: one is 
originally Greek, charis, and the other one is Latin, gratia, and was to be con-
sidered as the translation of the former. It also involves a group of deities, also 
originally Greek: the Charites, who became the three Graces, and whose ico-
nography can be traced over more than twenty-five centuries. Finally, it speaks 
of the interpretation of this allegory, which involves a reflection on exchange as 
a concept.
Taking these various associations as a point of departure, we shall wonder 
what kind of continuity can be detected between these notions, deities, this ico-
nography, and some of the contemporary anthropological developments regard-
ing forms of exchange. In particular, we will try to elucidate whether the consis-
tency between these different elements is due to anecdotal similarities or if it is 
possible to detect the existence of a genuine common ground, firmly rooted in 
our traditions of thought, which is still reflected in our way of thinking, analyti-
cally or not, about exchange practices. This is indeed the hypothesis that will be 
developed here, and which summarizes the perspective adopted in the comments 
that follow. 
Charis
The use of the term charis is longstanding. We find it in Homer. The two meanings 
of the word “grace” (as beauty and as favor) reflect the two chief meanings of charis, 
which seemingly coexisted from the outset. Charis also refers to the two ideas of 
pleasure and granted favor (Chantraine 1980). More importantly, the set of notions 
associated with this term in ancient Greece are consonant with a stream of thought 
on gift and exchange, as the works of Jean-Pierre Vernant ([1965] 2006) and Marcel 
Detienne ([1972] 1994) show. 
Vernant defines the Greek charis as “the divine power manifest in all aspects of 
gift giving and reciprocity (the round of generous liberality, the cordial exchange of 
gifts), which, in spite of all divisions, spins a web of reciprocal obligations” (Vernant 
[1965] 2006: 163). The author adds that “one of the oldest of all functions of charis 
is a woman’s giving herself to a man.” Detienne’s studies on mythology, in particular 
those related to the myth of Ixion, corroborate this general analysis of the charis, 
showing what happens a contrario in its absence: 
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In archaic Greece, as in other societies of the same type, the circulation 
of women cannot be dissociated from the exchange and the circulation of 
goods. At every level of social life the binding rule of gift and counter-gift 
applies, not only between men and gods, and between men and nature, 
but also between different groups of men. To thwart charis at any of these 
levels is to upset the entire system of exchange and presentation and to 
carry corruption to the very heart of the social order. (Detienne [1972] 
1994: 88)
In order to draw these reflections closer to the analyses of Mauss, especially those 
on the Polynesian concept of hau in The gift, several other aspects of the concept of 
charis must be noted, although it is not possible to develop them fully here. First, 
there is a double lack of differentiation associated with it. It appears, on the one 
hand, in the absence of a distinction between charis seen as a quality that would 
have been deified and the Charites (i.e., the three Graces) as a group of deities. 
Moreover, at this stage it seems that nothing radically distinguishes each of the 
deities’ functions, even if, in some cases, they appear as a collective group of god-
desses in which none are individualized, while in other cases they are singularized, 
and each one has a different name (Vernant [1965] 2006: 360). There is also the 
association, ancient but never lost, of the Charites with the notions of growth and 
fertility (ibid.: 277). Finally and above all, there is this specific quality which the 
charis grants to everything from which it emanates. Let us cite Vernant once more:
To the Greek, the charis does not only emanate from a woman’s body, 
or from any human being who “shines” with the beauty of youth, with a 
sparkle (often found in the eyes) that inspires love; it also emanates from 
finely chiseled jewelry, carefully carved jewels, and from certain precious 
fabrics; from the scintillation of metal, the bright reflection of a precious 
stone’s water, the polychrome quality of a weaving, and the vivid colors of 
the depiction of an animal or a vegetal setting with an intense liveliness. 
The silversmith’s and the weaver’s works also shine splendidly and render 
the gleam and light of flesh. (Vernant 1965: 261 n. 31)5
There is no doubt that this specific quality of the beings and objects that circulate in 
an exchange (which Vernant identified) very much resembles the mysterious qual-
ity that Mauss tirelessly tracks in every monograph, and over the continents, which 
he designates metaphorically as the mysterious form of power manifesting itself in 
the practice of exchange. Hence we may affirm that everything called for the Greek 
concept of charis to figure as a prominent example in Mauss’ work. Its almost com-
plete absence should only be the first among the reasons for our astonishment. 
Gratia
In spite of their lack of etymological kinship, the term gratia came to be considered 
as a legitimate translation of charis given that it was precisely and constantly used 
5. This is the translator’s English translation of Vernant’s endnote from the original 
French edition; it seems that this endnote was lost during the translation of the work 
into English. —Trans. 
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Figure 1: The Three Graces, fresco from Pompeii, Naples Museum of Archaeology.
by Latin authors as its equivalent. Émile Benveniste ([1969] 1973: 160) describes 
as follows the social process in which the word gratia and its linguistic family are 
involved: 
The connection with Latin words shows that the process at the beginning 
consisted of giving service for nothing, without reward; and this service, 
which was literally “gratuitous,” provokes in return the manifestation of 
what we call “gratefulness.” The notion of service that does not demand 
a counter-service is at the root of the notion, which for us moderns is 
twofold, “favor” and “gratefulness,” a sentiment which is felt by the one 
who gives and by the one who receives. They are reciprocal notions: the 
act conditions the sentiment; the sentiment inspires a certain form of 
behavior.  
Once again, we are definitely in the realm of the gift. But with this Latin equivalent 
to the notion of charis, the “sentiments” inspiring the actors, as well as the way in 
which these feelings are called upon in all aspects of social life, are paramount. This 
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is consistent with what Claude Moussy has shown in a work entirely dedicated to 
the analysis of gratia and its linguistic family:
All the values of gratia common in the Classical period can easily be 
explained from its fundamental meanings, both abstract: gratia as 
“recognition”; and concrete: gratia as “payment in return” or “benefit.” 
They all bear a link to the practice of benefaction, and this extension of 
gratia, stretching out from the vocabulary of recognition toward various 
domains, in particular to that of politics, is a good illustration of Seneca’s 
thesis, which envisions the entire edifice of social life resting on the pair 
“benefit–recognition.” (Moussy 1966: 410)
However, the common definition of gratia as “charm, grace, pleasure,” is incom-
mensurable with the previous meanings, and the intervention of charis in this new 
development of the Latin word seems quite plausible. As to the Christian sense of 
gratia, it derives from charis, usually translated as gratia in the Latin versions of the 
first works of Christian literature. 
Hence, from a comparison of the Latin notion and the Greek one, we can draw 
several observations. With gratia, the relational structure fostering cohesion be-
tween actors emerges, along with the definition and the analysis of sentiments 
that inspire or should inspire the practice of gifting. Thus is it not surprising that 
Seneca’s On benefits, from which I excerpted the interpretation of the allegory of the 
three Graces, is conceived as a practical and pedagogical treatise destined for those 
involved in gift giving. But it is precisely this pedagogy that presents a difficulty. 
When speaking of practices associated with beneficence, obligations to give, to 
receive, and to return, Seneca affirms that the challenge is to “organize the topic 
which more than any other binds together human society” (Seneca 2011: 22). But 
this affirmation comes here to support a plea in favor of practices that he judges 
insufficiently present in collective life. This is how one sees, in Seneca, the aware-
ness of a dissociation between two exchange circuits—which the terminological 
usages account for more generally, as Benveniste ([1969] 1973: 161–62) points out: 
It would be a serious error to believe that economic notions originate in 
needs of a material order which have to be satisfied, and that the terms 
which express these notions have merely a material sense. Everything 
relating to economic notions is bound up with a far wider range of 
ideas that concern the whole field of relationships between men and the 
relations of men with the gods. These are complex and difficult relations 
in which both parties are always implicated.
 Yet the reciprocal process of supply and payment can be interrupted 
voluntarily: thus we have services without return, offerings “by grace 
and favor,” pure acts of “grace,” which are the starting points of a new 
kind of reciprocity. Above the normal circuit of exchange—where one 
gives in order to obtain—there is a second circuit, that of benefice and 
gratefulness, of what is given without thought of return, of what is offered 
in “thankfulness.”  
Thus, contrary to charis, which according to Hellenic scholars was used in an-
cient Greece to signify a quality inherent in any authentic social exchange, gratia 
seems to have been dedicated to a much more specific exchange form, with specific 
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connotations. These connotations, more and more present in the use of gratia, also 
mark the modern notion of “gratuitousness.” 
Moreover, in the passage from charis to gratia we see the survival of other con-
notations associated with this term in ancient Greece. The concepts of “charm” 
and “pleasure” are still present, but there is more. When describing an old usage 
of charis, Vernant, as we have seen, spoke about “a woman’s giving herself to a 
man.” Let us refer now to the Christian signification, especially in St. Paul, “who 
seemingly introduced the word charis into the vocabulary of Christianity; who, in 
any case, was first to systematize the theology of Grace. Grace is above all a gift 
from God: it is God giving Himself gratuitously to mankind in the person of Jesus 
Christ” (Moussy 1966: 451). It is, in fact, that same charis that Christian baptism 
bestows on human beings. 
It is as if the comparison of charis and gratia reflected the gradual dissocia-
tion of a “total phenomenon.” In ancient Greece, the notion of charis—perhaps a 
genuine equivalent of the Polynesian hau—is commonly interpreted by scholars as 
the cement of any social exchange, and a mysterious quality present in both things 
and people; the notion of gratia, however, disseminated and preserved the Greek 
connotations of charis, but also altered them quite significantly. It came to denote 
an increasingly particular type of exchange (“gracious,” “gratuitous”) and specific 
qualities, be they sensible—the beauty of a woman—or, on the contrary, immate-
rial—Divine Grace. What has been lost apparently is the sense of an immanent and 
general connection between all the different connotations once associated with the 
term charis and which referred to all exchanges that bind society. But is it really 
from such a perspective that we must interpret the allegory of the three Graces?
The Charites
In order to progress further in our analysis, we must now turn to the Charites, 
minor deities of ancient Greece, whose memory was preserved thanks mainly to 
their iconography. We know little about these deities and their worship in ancient 
Greece. The references found in ancient authors, although quite frequent, are ex-
tremely laconic.6 The cult of the Charites seems to have been primarily associated 
with the “fertility” of nature, the “pleasure” and “joy” in love and human relations, 
and, finally, with gratitude and “benefits.” Each of these associations, of course, 
must be understood and resituated in the cultural and psychological context of 
ancient Greece. Suffice it to say here that the three Graces each bore names and 
more importantly had a filiation and alliances that varied greatly according to the 
poets who mentioned them (Homer, Hesiod, Pindar, Pausanias, etc.). Sometimes 
considered as three sisters, the daughters of Zeus, they were not always called by 
the names which Hesiod reports: Aglaea, Thalia, and Euphrosyne. As minor dei-
ties, the Charites were also relatively undifferentiated from nymphs, Muses, and 
Hours. Furthermore, the worship of these various entities was frequently conflated. 
Their function can also be contrasted with other groups of minor deities like the 
6. One may refer to Gsell ([1877] 1969) for further analysis on this matter, and a list of 
references on the Charites and their cult.
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Erynies (Vernant [1965] 2006: 412 n. 43). Their cult was sometimes brought to 
the forefront, as it was at Orchomenos in Boeotia; and it could occasion specific 
celebrations (the charitesia). But in general, their cult was associated with and sub-
ordinated to that of other deities such as Aphrodite or Apollo. 
Figure 2: The Three Graces, Acropolis Museum, Athens.
In the fragments of scattered information available about the Charites in ancient 
Greece, one can thus discern the different connotations that the Greeks associ-
ate with the notion of charis. But it was not until the Hellenistic period, with the 
first Stoics and their Roman successors, especially Seneca—and to a lesser extent, 
Servius—that the Charites came to be linked closely with the logic of the gift and 
of “benefits,” to the extent of becoming their privileged allegory. As we have seen 
above, Seneca describes the gift in such a way that, regardless of the temporal log-
ic, one feels like one is reading a pastiche of Mauss! One can also appreciate the 
rhetorical artifice with which Seneca equips himself to report the allegory of the 
three Graces: a very specific blend of false humility and genuine self-importance, 
authentic admiration and easy denigration—in short, an overall tone and com-
mentary style where one easily identifies a stranger’s viewpoint, almost, even, an 
ethnographer’s. 
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How can we understand, Seneca wonders, why “Chrysippus, who is famous for 
his sophisticated intellectual analysis that gets to the heart of the truth, and who 
only says what is needed to get the job done and never uses more words than he 
needs in order to be understood—Chrysippus, too, filled his entire book with this 
nonsense, leaving himself only a little bit of room to discuss the actual process of 
giving, receiving, and returning benefits” (Seneca 2011: 21)? That is a question fa-
miliar to anthropologists, and not only concerning the Greeks. And the following 
remark also has not always been without an equivalent, in the ethnographic litera-
ture on other cultures or different scholarly traditions: “Just you look out for me, 
if anyone takes me to task for knocking Chrysippus off his pedestal—he is a great 
man, of course, but still he is a Greek and his overly subtle sharpness gets blunted 
and even turned against him” (ibid.: 22). 
One problem with which anthropologists are also familiar is the impossibility of 
knowing—given how the allegory of the three Graces is reported to us—what the re-
spective contributions were of Seneca, Hecaton, or Chrysippus, and what the sourc-
es of the latter author were. Hence, by a coincidence that is perhaps not meaningless, 
this astonishing description of the gift has an epistemological status reminiscent of 
our modern ethnographic descriptions (Sperber 1985). First, this wavering is due 
to the difficulty of associating the interpretation of the three Graces with an au-
thor or even with a precise culture—Greek or Latin. This comment on the gift was 
ultimately preserved thanks to the confrontation between two cultures. Moreover, 
it is because Seneca’s text shows us clearly that during the Hellenistic period, the 
logic of gift giving, this illusion of a “total phenomenon,” is, in fact, already merely 
a dreamed universe of sociability. Only the artifice of an allegory can introduce us 
to it, and this arouses Seneca’s suspicions as it is not good to believe “that frivolous 
fictions and arguments fit for old women might be able to prevent the most destruc-
tive possible turn of events: a universal cancellation of benefits” (Seneca 2011: 23). 
It would therefore be an error of interpretation to mistake what is presented un-
ambiguously as an allegory for what could be taken, outside the context of its utter-
ance, as a representative description of a state of society; a society that would, more-
over, remain in need of precise identification. By describing this allegory, Seneca 
does not pretend to do more than to submit to the rules of art and to the intellectual 
trends of his time, although not without a certain disdain, as some of his reflec-
tions, like this supposition, indicate: “But suppose that someone is so dedicated to 
the Greeks that he thinks these questions are vital.” (Seneca 2011: 21). However, 
Seneca underestimates the possibility that Chrysippus had used this allegory in the 
same way as he does, that is, precisely as an allegory and for purely allegorical pur-
poses. So what is transmitted from one thinker to another, and Seneca is an integral 
part of this chain, is probably neither a belief nor a superstition. It is a particular 
way of thinking about exchange in society through select images that illustrate this 
conception, in order to have it understood and to make it more desirable. To think 
that scholars like Mauss may have thought, many centuries later, that one could 
find in ancient or exotic societies the same ideal of sociability because the desire 
for it was maintained while the allegorical character of this ideal had been lost, is 
not only an attractive hypothesis but also one that may have the advantage of being 
accurate, as I will try to show. But let us still continue our investigation by focusing 
this time, more precisely, on the iconography of the three Graces as such.
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The iconography of the three Graces
Figure 3: The Three Graces, marble statue, Metropolitan Museum of Art, Roman copy  
of a Greek original from the second century bc.
It is convenient to distinguish two periods in the iconography of the three Graces, 
one “ancient” and the other “modern.”
The ancient period
Archaic representations
One may find a few pieces of information on the first visual representations of the 
three Graces in the same way as one can find rare and scattered references to their 
cult and mythology.7 At the time of their debut, the three Graces had not yet started 
7.  For a survey of the iconographic corpus of that period, see Gsell (1969: 1664–65).
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the round dance that would immortalize them. In some temples, in Orchomenos, 
for example, they were represented by rocks and at Elis by wooden statues in golden 
clothing, whose faces were made out of marble. But most importantly, in the bas-
reliefs of the time, it seems the Charites were conventionally shown in profile or in 
a three-quarter view in three-quarters, holding hands and in a single file. Moreover, 
they were always represented draped in cloth.
Representations of the Hellenistic period
It is during the Hellenistic period, first in Greece and then in Rome, that the three 
Graces acquired the iconography that would serve as their canonical representa-
tion in the modern era (Deonna 1930). From that moment on, the representations 
of the three Graces showed them dancing in a circle: the one in the center is rep-
resented from the back while the others are more or less facing the viewer, while 
also in a three-quarters orientation. As in the previous period, the three Graces 
hold each other by the arms or shoulders, and they often have symbolic attributes 
(fruits, vegetables) in hand that they circulate among themselves. Finally, follow-
ing an aesthetic trend that certainly began in Aphrodite’s representations, the three 
Graces were increasingly shown naked. If one believes Pausanias, this new repre-
sentation of the three Graces spread from one particular artistic work. There was, 
indeed, in the new configuration of these deities, an element of novelty that did 
not seem to be only related to their symbolism; it may have also been related to the 
masterly way their dance was depicted from an aesthetic point of view, thanks to 
an ingenious spatial arrangement. Moreover, considering that the representation of 
the three Graces required the artist to depict the female body from all angles in one 
single composition, we may sense there a reason that, regardless of any symbolic 
association, can explain the particular appeal of this divine group.
The modern period
Medieval representations
The memory of the three Graces was never completely lost in the Middle Ages 
(Wind 1958: 44 n. 35). By contrast, it is interesting to notice how, concerning its 
iconography more specifically, contact was lost for several centuries with the depic-
tions that were prominent during the Hellenistic period, and which only resurfaced 
during the Renaissance. Medieval artists, who did not draw inspiration from the 
models of the past, used their own traditions of representation to invent an image 
of the deities matching the textual descriptions they built upon in a rather literal 
manner. Jean Seznec, who studied in detail how images of ancient gods were pre-
served, modified, or transformed up until the Renaissance, provides an example 
regarding Remi’s commentary on Martianus, dating from the year 1100, which il-
lustrates well such a process: 
Yet as we examine them more carefully, we see that the artist has not 
indulged in pure fancy; on the contrary, he has taken pains to follow as 
carefully as possible the directions of a certain text. . . . The text tells him, 
for instance, that Apollo carries the three Graces in his hand. Remi has 
taken this detail from Macrobius, who had it from Pausanias: “Apollinis 
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simulacra manu dextera Gratias gestant” (Saturnalia I, 17). What is 
called for here is thus a small replica of the group of the three Graces. 
Our draftsman, however, who has never seen anything of the sort, naïvely 
pictures a kind of bouquet out of which emerge three female busts. 
(Seznec [1940] 1961: 168)
There are other “deviant” illustrations of the three Graces, related to the same pe-
riod in their iconography, for instance in the moralized manuscripts of Ovid, or in 
the Tarocchi (Tarot card games) (ibid.: 199). 
Representations since the Renaissance
Figure 4: A detail of Primavera, Sandro Boticelli, 1478/1482, Uffizi, Firenze.
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The renewal of the Hellenistic representation occurred in the second half of the 
fifteenth century, and from then on it quickly became dominant. The discovery of 
an ancient sculpture depicting the three Graces in Siena played a crucial role, as it 
allowed artists to become acquainted with the old way of portraying them. 
Figure 5: The Three Graces, Raphael, 1534/1535, Musée de Chantilly.
This discovery is known to us thanks to Raphael, who drew numerous sketches of 
the sculpture. 
Subsequently, a host of great artists offered an interpretation of the allegory: 
among them were painters, printmakers, and sculptors of the Renaissance. Raphael, 
Raimondi, Correggio, Francesco del Cossa, Vasari, Dürer, Botticelli, Clodion, Ger-
main Pilon, portrayed the Graces strictly following the ancient models, more or 
less, while Titian or Tintoretto gave freer interpretations. From then on, artists, like 
Rubens in the seventeenth century or Boucher in the eighteenth century, continu-
ally drew inspiration from the iconography of the three Graces, even as the mean-
ing of the allegory was progressively lost. 
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Figure 6: The Three Graces, Lucas Cranach the Elder, 1531, Musée de Louvre, Paris.
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Figure 7: The Three Graces, Rubens, 1639, Prado Museum, Madrid.
Perspectives on the gift
Representations of the Charites existed in ancient Greece. Similarly, the notion of 
charis had always been associated with the system of presentations typical of the 
gift. But it was really during the Hellenistic period, in Athens and in Rome, that an 
effort of conceptualization regarding the social implications of the gift took as its 
starting point the theme of the three Graces. As we have already seen briefly, it was 
based on a constant renewal of the iconography of these deities. 
2014 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 4 (2): 339–368
355 The three Graces, or the allegory of the gift
Seneca’s perspective
In Seneca’s commentary, which draws inspiration from Chrysippus, several points 
are noteworthy. Seneca refuses, for instance, to individualize each of the Charites. 
With a biting irony, he ridicules the way Greek poets and thinkers individually 
assigned them a name and a genealogy: “Each authority twists the interpreta-
tion of these names as it suits him, trying to reduce them to some orderly plan; 
in fact, though, Hesiod just assigned to the girls the names that he felt like giving 
them” (Seneca 2011: 21). By ignoring completely the specific identity of each of 
the Charites, Seneca does not purport to innovate, but he intends to give a more 
universal scope to this allegory. It is also why he does not seek to define what each 
of the Charites precisely stands for. Let us cite again this passage: 
Some people advance the view that one of them stands for giving a 
benefit, one for receiving it, and one for returning it. Others hold that 
they represent three kinds of benefactors: those who confer benefits, 
those who return them, and those who accept benefits and return them 
at the same time. But no matter which of these interpretations you decide 
is true, what good does this specialized knowledge do for us? (Seneca 
2011: 21).
Each of the Charites stands for a significant gesture of the gift relationship. But just 
like Lévi-Strauss when he analyzes the structure of exchange, Seneca grants less 
importance to the precise definition of each of these gestures than to the “orderly 
sequence” that constitutes itself through them. He insists that it is not enough to 
find a willingness to give. There must be simultaneously a willingness to receive 
and a willingness to return. Closer in this regard to Mauss than to Lévi-Strauss, for 
Seneca, taking this simultaneity into account does not imply any form of automatic 
complementarity among these three archetypical gestures. What really is needed, 
he suggests, is to find out the necessary conditions so that such synthesis may ef-
fectively take place: “Our job is to discuss benefits and to organize the topic which 
more than any other binds together human society” (ibid.: 22). For he has assigned 
to himself the duty to help “prevent the most destructive possible turn of events: 
a universal cancellation of benefits” (ibid.: 23). From the same perspective, the re-
markable advantage of the allegory of the three Graces is to allow the representa-
tion and thereby the comprehension, though a series of symbols, of the necessary 
complementarity of the gestures involved in gift giving and the no less indispens-
able role succession implied by these gestures. 
There was indeed a difficulty, both logical and iconographic, in attempting to 
represent, in a unified iconographic space, gestures that are otherwise defined by a 
temporal succession. It is the dynamic intuitively associated with dancing, and to 
round dances in particular in this case, that allowed the paradox to be resolved. For 
Chrysippus or Seneca, it was necessary that there be three Graces because it is the 
minimal number needed to represent the three fundamental gestures characteristic 
of the gift in one single moment, and thereby in a single representation. Hence, if 
one of the Graces is presented to us from the back and the two others in profile or 
facing us, this is only due to the constraint of solid geometry. However, space is not 
oriented here from the viewer’s position. The fact that the deities are facing him or 
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her does not have a particular signification.8 This is a fundamental difference be-
tween the analysis offered by Seneca and the one proposed by Servius, which was 
also abundantly cited and analyzed by commentators after him.
Servius’ perspective 
Servius wrote a famous gloss on the three Graces in the fourth century, that is, three 
centuries after Seneca. Contrarily to the latter, who still described the Graces wear-
ing transparent dresses, Servius accounted for their nudity. But above all, it is the 
interpretation of the positions assigned to each of the Graces that changed with this 
author: “That one of them is pictured from the back while the two others face us is 
because for one benefit issuing from us two others are supposed to return” (Servius 
2004: 1.720; English translation found in Wind 1958: 28).
Servius’ interpretation involves a new element. As we have seen, in ancient 
Greece the notion of charis was associated with growth and fertility. A symbol of 
this association was in fact preserved through the vegetal attributes often placed in 
the hands of the deities. But this reference disappears completely with Chrysippus 
and Seneca. In their conception of the “orderly sequence” of benefits, it is the ges-
ture that matters, as well as the human relations that are established and affirmed 
with gift giving. But as Seneca repeatedly and precisely indicates, its signification 
is independent from the material reality of the objects that circulate from hand to 
hand by way of the gift. By contrast, for Servius and other authors after him like 
Boccaccio, the benefactor can legitimately expect the “benefit” associated with his 
gesture. The apparent gratuitousness of the gift does not show the disinterest of 
the giver since, on the contrary, a benefit in return is promised to him—a benefit 
delayed, but that will amount to twice what was given. It is also interesting to note 
that such a perspective, relying on the hope of future gains, is conveyed by a new 
interpretation of the representation of the three Graces. As we have seen before, in 
ancient Greece, the three deities were shown in profile and were advancing in line, 
parallel to the viewer. Then, during the Hellenistic period, they started dancing 
in a circle, and the viewer found him- or herself in a decentered position vis-à-vis 
them. But at the end of the Hellenistic period, the perspective changed again. The 
depiction of the three Graces became still. This time, the axis that extends from 
the viewer to the deities was explicitly taken into account. The giver’s function was 
identified with the central deity, who turns her back to the viewer. The two other 
Graces, situated on her two sides and facing, represent the recipients of the gift. 
In Chrysippus’ interpretation, the one relayed by Seneca, the logic of the gift was 
defined by three fundamental gestures—to give, to receive, to return—each em-
bodied by one of the three deities. With Servius, however, the perspective changed. 
There are only two fundamental gestures left—to give and to return—and if one of 
them is symbolized by one deity and the second by two of them, it is only, we are 
told, to express the quantitative difference between what passes from hand to hand 
8. One should note here the substantial compatibility between Seneca’s analysis in 
that particular context and the Stoic doctrine regarding space and time, presented in 
Goldschmidt’s work (2011).
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on the occasion of the gift and what compensates it in a second movement. Servius’ 
interpretation, however, although it is frequently cited, more recent and detailed, 
did not supplant Seneca’s, and these two perspectives were in fact maintained up 
until the Renaissance. 
The perspective of the Renaissance
The theme of the three Graces was at its peak during the Renaissance, in partic-
ular among humanist authors like Marsilio Ficino or Picco dela Mirandola. The 
three deities were assigned a central position among allegorical figures in their new 
versions of Neoplatonism. Ficino, for instance, gave the title Charitum Ager (the 
Graces’ place) to his villa in Carregi, where he hosted a Neoplatonic academy. Picco 
dela Mirandola also took them as his emblem and engraved them on the obverse 
side of his personal medal. Three words accompany their representation on the 
medal—pulchirtudo, amor, voluptas—each word supposing to correspond to one of 
the Graces. This citation, taken from Wind (1958: 36), gives a general idea of the 
symbolism of the three Graces in the Renaissance: 
While the triad of the Graces signified liberality to the Stoics, for the 
Neoplatonists it was a symbol of love, inviting celestial meditations. Since 
the Graces were described and pictured as attendants of Venus, it seemed 
reasonable to infer that they unfold her attributes: for it was the axiom of 
Platonic Theology that every god exerts his power in a triadic rhythm.
This new signification of the symbolism of the three Graces was associated, subse-
quently, with a renewed interpretation of their iconography. For Servius, the most 
important element was the confrontation between the central deity, identified with 
the act of gift giving, and the two others, symbolizing the return of the gift. During 
the Renaissance, however, the scene came to be interpreted differently. The central 
deity’s volte-face in relation to the viewer was now enhanced. It was understood as a 
way of turning away from earthly considerations to contemplate the spiritual realm. 
This signification was reinforced by the way the two other deities were conse-
quently reinterpreted. The accent was no longer placed on their symmetry in rela-
tion to the central deity, but, on the contrary, on the asymmetry that appears as soon 
as one neglects the overall position of the bodies to pay attention to the orientation 
of their faces and gaze. The reading of the scene was no longer static: the new inter-
pretation had to be based on the dynamic that animates the scene. It was no longer 
about dance, as in the Stoic tradition, but about the reinvention of a particular genre: 
All that we have to remember is that the bounty bestowed by the gods upon 
lower beings was conceived by the Neoplatonists as a kind of overflowing 
(emanatio), which produced a vivifying rapture or conversion (called 
by Ficino conversio, raptio or vivificatio) whereby the lower beings were 
drawn back to heaven and rejoined the gods (remeatio). The munificence 
of the gods having thus been unfolded in the triple rhythm of emanatio, 
raptio, and remeatio, it was possible to recognize in this sequence the 
divine model of what Seneca had defined as the circle of Grace: giving, 
accepting and returning. (Wind 1958: 38) 
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While Servius’ commentaries on the gift had privileged a rather materialistic inter-
pretation of gratia and had essentially dealt with the nature of human transactions 
(their social and material quality), the Humanist reading of Plato instead placed the 
emphasis on a very specific and largely metaphysical notion of love—amor—which 
took preeminence in their interpretations over the previous connotations associ-
ated with charis and gratia:
If we further consider that all communion between mortals and gods 
was established, according to Plato, through the mediation of Love, 
it becomes clear why in Ficino’s and Pico’s system the entire Greek 
pantheon began to revolve around Venus and Amor. All the parts of the 
splendid machine (machinae membra), Ficino wrote, “are fastened to 
each other by a kind of mutual charity, so that it may justly be said that 
love is the perpetual knot and link of the universe: amor nodus perpetuus 
et copula mundi.” Although Venus remained one deity among others, 
and as such the bestower only of particular gifts, she defined, as it were, 
the universal system of exchange by which divine gifts are graciously 
circulated. The image of the Graces, linked by the knot of mutual charity 
(segnesque nodum solvere Gratiae), supplied a perfect figure to illustrate 
the dialectical rhythm of Ficino’s universe. (Wind 1958: 38–39)
The search for spirituality in this new interpretation of the three Graces found a 
superior aesthetic translation in the painting of Botticelli, Primavera, currently on 
display in Florence’s Uffizi gallery (see above, Figure 4). In this picture, the rep-
resentation of the three Graces, wearing transparent dresses and holding hands, 
seems to be directly inspired by Seneca’s description. Indeed Botticelli was a keen 
illustrator of these kinds of allegories, inspired by the Neoplatonists, and which had 
become popular in the Medici circle.
 However, this new proximity between the image and its ancient gloss must not 
delude us. There is some paradox in closely associating a spiritual quest with the 
rather carnal theme of the three Graces; and such a paradox was ever apparent, as 
Wind suggests, in the ancient use of this theme by the Stoic masters of antiquity. 
This also led Wind to postulate the possibility of an Epicurean origin for the al-
legoric use of the three Graces. But whether it is the case or not, there is no doubt 
that, during the Renaissance, not all artists felt obliged or inclined to follow the 
scholastic interpretation of the most fashionable allegories of the time, and to at-
tenuate the carnal quality of the representation of the three Graces in the manner 
of Raphael (see above, Figure 5) or Botticelli. Correggio, as well as many painters 
of the Fontainebleau school, for example, did not hesitate to emphasize the theme’s 
intense sensuality. 
This also explains what happened by the end of the Renaissance, when there 
was a progressive breaking of the link between the scholarly interpretation of phil-
osophical origin and an iconography, largely inspired by it, but also loaded with 
sensuality. Then, the theme of the three Graces survived thanks to its iconographic 
appeal, but it also became more and more remote from any association—scholarly 
or not—with the idea of gift giving. The three Graces were still frequently repre-
sented dancing, but not necessarily in a circle, and regardless of the viewer’s posi-
tion. However, they remained associated with Love, most of the time depicted con-
ventionally as the flying baby (putto) escorting the Graces. One may then follow 
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from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries—with Tintoretto, Rubens, Boucher, 
or Watteau—how this visual allegory progressively lost its conventional sense and 
also became more closely associated—Watteau is a good example of this transfor-
mation—with the courteous pleasures of Love. 
An evolutionist temptation
From what has been seen above, it is possible to trace the guiding lines of an evolu-
tion of the theme of the three Graces. And one could argue that the history of such 
a theme reflects, beyond this specific example, an evolution of behaviors and atti-
tudes that bears witness to a progressive change in civilization. This is what I would 
like to show briefly. But on this occasion, it is better to summarize first the various 
elements of our investigation. 
In the beginning, we have the Greek notion of charis. This notion, as is often 
the case in ancient Greece, was represented by a group of minor deities—in this 
particular case, the Charites. Poets like Homer, Hesiod, or Pindar progressively as-
signed names to these deities, as well as genealogies and sometimes mythologies. 
There was also some worship of them, often in the context of the cult of more im-
portant divinities of the Pantheon: Zeus, Apollo, Hermes, Aphrodite. The Charites 
were often represented with the latter deities or placed in the entrance hall of their 
sanctuaries. It is possible to learn all this thanks to the compilations of archeolo-
gists, philologists, and historians of ancient Greece; and our sources are altogether 
numerous, diverse, and reliable. 
Then, during the Hellenistic period, two singular events occurred. A new way 
of visualizing the three Graces replaced the ancient iconography. There is no ab-
solute proof that this developed from an original model that would have served 
as a reference, but it is the most likely hypothesis. Moreover, at the same period, 
philosophers—in particular, Chrysippus, a master of ancient Stoicism—used the 
image of the three Graces as a central allegory in their conception of the gift, 
most certainly inspired by the wealth of connotations that had long been asso-
ciated with the notion of charis and with the Charites. It is, then, plausible that 
the new iconography of the three Graces was born that way, under the influence 
of the gloss of these thinkers. But unfortunately there are no contemporary ac-
counts of what happened at that time in Greece. What we know we owe to later 
sources of Roman origin. This is true both regarding representations of the three 
Graces—paintings and sculptures—and concerning the interpretation of this al-
legory proposed by ancient Stoics, which we are familiar with almost exclusively 
thanks to Seneca. Although we know that numerous intermediaries spread the 
teachings of ancient Stoicism in Rome, we have invariably lost track of them, as 
it is the case, for instance, for Hecate’s works, even though it is certain that they 
influenced Seneca. 
Seneca did not conceal that his perspective on ancient Greek authors was both 
critical and selective. If he transmitted the allegory of the three Graces in On ben-
efits, he said, priding himself on his offhandedness, it was without granting it much 
importance. But although he did not trust the immediacy and the validity of the 
teaching that could be drawn from an image or a myth, he paradoxically reinforced 
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the significance of this allegory, somewhat in spite of himself. He did so, first, by 
endorsing the role of agent in this transmission: it seems that Seneca is the sole 
source accounting for its importance among the first Stoics. Second, and most im-
portantly, he did so because he systematized its interpretation in accordance with 
his own conceptions regarding the practice of gifting in society. However, the unex-
pected consequence of his intervention in this domain was less to abolish the need 
to resort to an allegory than to guarantee the allegory’s subsequent success. Thus, 
the Charites became known in Rome not so much as other Greek gods and god-
desses whose cult was absorbed by the Romans during the Hellenistic period, but, 
rather, from the beginning, as purely allegorical figures, allowing their use as such 
by artists, poets, and thinkers. 
However, aside from this fragile thread by which the allegory of the three Graces 
was passed on and systematized from Athens to Rome, another form of accultura-
tion, more diffuse but more significant, also occurred: it was the slow assimilation 
of the connotations associated with charis and the acclimation of the notion—rath-
er than a mere translation—in Latin, through the term of gratia. The effect was all 
the more interesting as three streams of signification soon coexisted in the notion 
of gratia. The first involved the old connotations attached to charis, which can be 
found in the close association of gifting gestures, charm, and the interior beauty 
that the gesture confers. The second stream embraced connotations that were more 
specifically Roman, referring precisely to the procedures of gift giving; they charac-
terized this practice by associating it with notions such as beneficence and gratuity. 
Finally, a third stream assembled the new Christian connotations associated at first 
with charis, then with gratia, and which eventually came to characterize the notion 
of Divine Grace. 
This probably explains the success of the allegory of the three Graces in the Re-
naissance. Indeed, it was a period during which intellectual milieux took pleasure 
in rediscovering and deftly handling the different—and often paradoxical—con-
notations and associations associated with gratia or embodied by the three Graces. 
Offering an opportunity to reinterpret Seneca in a Neoplatonic sense, but also in 
a rather Epicurean manner in the way it illustrated a notion then at the heart of 
Christianity, the allegory of the three Graces offered Renaissance artists and hu-
manists a perfect occasion to celebrate creatively the marriage of spirituality and 
sensuality. They all leaped at the opportunity.
After the Renaissance, it became more and more dubious to present the image 
of the naked and dancing Graces as a representation, even if only allegorical, of 
Divine Grace. However, in the seventeenth century, their representation was still 
judged sufficiently edifying for the Graces to preside, in Rubens’ painting, over the 
education of Marie de Medici (see above, Figure 7). But as the paintings of Boucher 
and Watteau can testify, from the eighteenth century onward, they mainly symbol-
ized the charms of love. From this we can summarize how the fate of the three 
Graces can be interpreted over time: 
•	 	A	first	period,	associated	with	ancient	Greece.	The	use	of	the	notion	of	charis at 
that time is well reflected by the analyses of Gernet or Vernant, who interpret it 
as a key notion of the exchange, similar to the way Mauss used the Māori hau 
for his analysis of the sociocultural systems of Polynesia. 
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•	 	A	 second	period,	 the	Hellenistic	 era.	Both	 in	 the	 evolution	of	 the	notion	of	
gratia and in Seneca’s analysis, it becomes clear that the logic of the gift can no 
longer be interpreted as if it were involving the society as a whole. As Benveniste 
shows, the practice of gift giving is now identified to a “second circuit,” inter-
rupting the normal circuit of exchange. 
•	 	A	third	and	last	period,	corresponding	to	modern	times	from	the	Renaissance	
to the present. The notion of gratia has been divided between a purely spiritual 
dimension, to which the Neoplatonic Humanists of the Renaissance gave a new 
philosophical dimension, and a more sensual dimension still present today, in 
particular in the iconographic representation of the three Graces. Here we have 
come full circle and the three Graces, after a centuries-long peripetias, have 
become a fully secularized iconographic theme, with no obvious connection 
henceforth with the gift.
As I will now show, there is little doubt that someone like Mauss would have in-
terpreted such an evolution in the interpretation of the three Graces as a simple 
illustration of a more significant evolution, that is, the progressive marginalization 
of gift practices at the core of Western culture and society. The question, however, 
is to know if one is to take this sort of analysis at face value: is there not another 
way of interpreting what has been quickly summarized here about this allegory of 
the gift?
An opening to the world
As a conclusion to The gift, Marcel Mauss clearly advocates what he sees as a return 
to the archaic and ancient values that characterize a society based on the gift: 
First of all, we return, as return we must, to habits of “aristocratic 
extravagance.” As is happening in English-speaking countries and so 
many other contemporary societies, whether made up of savages or the 
highly civilized, the rich must come back to considering themselves—
freely and also by obligation—as the financial guardians of their fellow 
citizens. Among ancient civilizations, from which ours has sprung, 
some had a (debtors’) jubilee, others liturgies (of duty) such as choregies 
and trierarchies, and syussitia (meals in common), and the obligatory 
expenditure by the aedile and the consular dignitaries. We should return to 
laws of this kind. . . . Thus we can and must return to archaic society and to 
elements in it. We shall find in this reasons for life and action that are still 
prevalent in certain societies and numerous social classes: the joy of public 
giving; the pleasure in generous expenditure on the arts, in hospitality, and 
in the private and public festival. (Mauss [1925] 1990: 88–89)
One may notice once more that such a plea in favor of evergetism seems to echo 
some of Seneca’s reflections in On benefits.9 May one then conclude that Mauss’ text 
should be understood as a recent milestone in the line of commentaries about the 
9. To learn more on evergetism in Hellenistic antiquity, both in Greece and Rome, see 
Veyne ([1976] 1990).
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practices of the gift, which has been ongoing in Western culture from Chrysippus 
to Hecaton, Seneca to Servius, Marsilio Ficino to Picco dela Mirandola? Some pas-
sages written by Mauss in The gift seem to confirm that one may effectively inter-
pret the essay in this perspective. Does he not explain himself, for example, that 
“the themes of the gift, of the freedom and the obligation inherent in the gift, of 
generosity and self-interest that are linked in giving, are reappearing in French so-
ciety, as a dominant motif too long forgotten”? (ibid.: 87). And in another passage, 
he explains as well that he is “[posing] once more, in different forms, questions that 
are old but ever new” (ibid.: 5). 
What distinguishes Mauss, however, from his predecessors is the nature of the 
argumentation he uses in his essay in order to promote a return to a society based 
on the gift (an ambition that he quickly reduced, like his predecessors, to a modest 
plea in favor of euergetism). Until then, none of the authors that we have referred 
to had ever presented a society exclusively based on gift giving as something that 
may have actually existed. This is also why the state of “grace” that the existence 
of such a system would imply was usually presented either as a miraculous out-
come that could only result from the interaction between men and deities, or 
as an allegory illustrated by poets and artists, from Goethe to Raphael. In the 
work of Mauss, however, one does not find a single reference to Chrysippus or 
Seneca, nor any allusion to the three Graces, to charis, gratia, to amor, to the no-
tions of charm, grace, gratuity—all notions which have been traditionally at the 
core of such a problematic in Western culture. To argue in favor of a system of 
human relations founded on the practice of the gift, authors since antiquity had 
strived to show in what ways such a system was effectively desirable and they had 
presented it as a charmed ideal. With Mauss, however, the perspective changed 
completely, because he believed that ethnographic works brought the historical 
and sociological confirmation that the logic of gift giving actually constituted the 
milestone of all societies. Hence, what had generally been presented as an ideal 
altogether desirable and yet in many ways unrealistic by a long succession of phi-
losophers, religious minds, skilled politicians, disillusioned preceptors, and idle 
courtiers finally acquired the remarkable dignity of being now considered as a 
“total phenomenon.”
One should not, however, consider, as a result, that the underlying logic of the 
problematic of the gift had completely changed with Mauss: in fact, one of his mer-
its is that he offered a wider insight into the problem posed with the paradox situ-
ated in the “voluntary character of these total services, apparently free and disin-
terested but nevertheless constrained and self-interested” (Mauss [1925] 1990: 4). 
What fundamentally changed was the nature of the arguments used. While authors 
in the past only used rhetorical images and ancient literature in order to illustrate 
their opinion and defend their point of view, Mauss aimed to show that, as a pru-
dent thinker, it was from social facts, past and present, and only using these, that 
he built his analyses. This is actually why there is an obvious complementarity be-
tween, and, we may say, an underlying logic explaining, Mauss’ absence of interest 
in the intellectual history which he unknowingly prolonged, and the way he used 
reconstitutions of sociological realities, even if they were at times fragile, to “dem-
onstrate” that his theses were fully justified. Lévi-Strauss’ conception of the gift, by 
contrast, breaks away from this underlying logic. 
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From gift to exchange
The way in which Lévi-Strauss interpreted The gift in his famous introduction dat-
ed from 1950, is quite disconcerting. It is easy to perceive all that Mauss’ reflection 
owed to a scholarly tradition of which his colleagues and he were the direct heirs, 
even if they never acknowledged it. But, speaking about Mauss, it is more sur-
prising, for instance, to affirm that “empirical observation finds not exchange, but 
only, as Mauss himself says, ‘three obligations: giving, receiving, returning’” (Lévi-
Strauss [1950] 1987: 46). We have seen, on the contrary, that it was precisely his 
own cultural tradition that Mauss was following—perhaps unknowingly—when 
he analyzed the gift, after so many others, by way of these three obligations. Hence 
it is slightly paradoxical to reproach him, as Lévi-Strauss did, for not having fol-
lowed completely his own principles in favor of a “New Zealand theory” when he 
did precisely the opposite.
Similarly, when Lévi-Strauss wrote a few pages later that “what happened in that 
essay, for the first time in the history of ethnological thinking, was that an effort was 
made to transcend empirical observation and to reach deeper realities” (ibid.: 38), 
we saw, quite to the contrary, that Mauss’ intellectual originality was precisely of an 
“empirical” order: it consisted in renewing an originally Western thematic by seek-
ing its validation in new facts, gathered, in particular, from other societies. 
For Mauss just as much as for the authors of antiquity, the crucial challenge was 
to find how to instigate a more desirable form of sociability, seemingly embodied in 
the practice of the gift. But the difference between Mauss and his predecessors is that 
instead of seeking to convince the reader of the importance of gift giving by empha-
sizing its moral, desirable, necessary, or rewarding character, he strived to show that 
such a set of attitudes constituted, in fact, an ineluctable and universal given in every 
society. Its apparent absence in our society was, as a matter of fact, merely a tempo-
rary aberration, and most certainly transitory. This means that just like Chrysippus, 
Seneca, Servius, or Marsilio Fino, Marcel Mauss in his time sought to convince that 
there was nothing worse for a society than the “universal cancellation of benefits.” 
Nevertheless, the ambiguity in Mauss’ approach was to partly conflate the sys-
tem of specific attitudes characterizing the gift and the very different reality of the 
exchanges that exist in various domains of social life. This confusion was not total 
since he considered the practice of gift giving and the attitudes it involved as “ar-
chaic forms of exchange,” in opposition to what he called “self-interested exchange,” 
which he viewed as characteristic of modern society. If we are to trust the meaning 
of words, we can only qualify a gift as a “gift” if a benefit in return is not systemati-
cally guaranteed. Of course, this does not imply that the gift must be disinterested. 
But what may be viewed as the risk or the inherent greatness of the gift is precisely 
that it is, essentially, a unidirectional gesture. Hence, the gift may, at most, be as-
similated to an exchange if it is understood that it will be an exchange of a particu-
lar type, whose nature it is to be always problematic and without the guarantee of 
reciprocity. Ultimately, this was indeed how Mauss envisioned the problem posed 
by the analysis of the system of presentation of the gift. 
Mauss was careful to preserve intact the particular thematic of the gift, while 
confusing it, in some sequences of his reasoning, with a primitive or fundamen-
tal modality of the exchange. Anthropology is not necessarily an exact science. 
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Lévi-Strauss read Mauss literally and refused to see in the gift something other 
than the objective reality of an exchange. For him, the gift is solely a sophisticated 
and complex form, whose true nature will generally escape, for this very reason, the 
indigenous people themselves, as they only have a partial and subjective view of the 
social universe in which they are immersed.
Confronted with such an argument and without developing it further, it may 
be useful to note that the reasoning is not in fact that radically new, as it was al-
ways invoked by the partisans of the gift: of course, they sometimes brought up the 
idea that it was merely a disguised, and thereby advantageous, form of exchange. 
However, they obviously had some difficulties convincing anyone that a society 
existed in which such a conviction was universally shared. This is why they had to 
resort to the allegory and to a host of varied arguments to convince those to whom 
they spoke of the value of their analyses. The real innovation, which was transmit-
ted from Mauss to Lévi-Strauss, was, firstly, to assume that primitive and archaic 
societies could be founded on systems of total presentations of the kind that were 
expressed through gift giving. But also, it was to do so while suggesting simultane-
ously that the functioning of such systems did not create any problem, if only possi-
bly in the mind of rare indigenous theoreticians unable to understand the subtleties 
of their own societies. It must be noted as well that such a point of view could only 
be helped by the functionalism that has dominated most ethnographic research. 
The problematic of the gift
From Mauss to Lévi-Strauss, therefore, one witnesses the short-lived resurgence of 
a problematic of the gift, the main interest of which was to open this field of reflec-
tion to a diversity of cultures and civilizations. But Lévi-Strauss, because he did not 
acknowledge, like Mauss, the essentially problematic nature of the gift, struggled 
on the contrary to assimilate the moments that characterized it as a complex form 
of exchange. It must be added that, unfortunately building upon what was the most 
arguable in Mauss’ theses in the framework of his own argumentation, Lévi-Strauss 
adopted a conception of primitive societies in which the gift, now classified among 
other categories of exchange, ends up losing its specificity entirely. 
It is in such a context that we should consider what was lost when the reflec-
tion on the gift was cut off, under cover of scientism, from the ancient tradition to 
which this debate was related. Thus was ignored the most fundamental fact that 
there is no automatism in the gift and that there never was any. 
The exchange or the gift: Illustration for a reflection
A society based on the gift: it is a dream and a utopia that inspired many reflections 
and beautiful works of art in the Western tradition. We will give a last illustration, 
which does not mark a clearly identifiable evolution in our societies but rather re-
veals the boundless imagination of people (of males in particular, in this case) and 
of their cultures. We started our investigation by the analysis of the word charis, 
which led us to refer to Vernant’s analyses concerning this notion:
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In this connection, one of the essential aspects of Greek charis should be 
emphasized: charis is the divine power manifest in all aspects of gift giving 
and reciprocity (the round of generous liberality, the cordial exchange of 
gifts), which, in spite of all divisions, spins a web of reciprocal obligations, 
and one of the oldest of all functions of charis is a woman’s giving herself 
to a man. (Vernant [1965] 2006: 163) 
Figure 8: The Three Graces, Robert Delaunay, 1912, private collection.
2014 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 4 (2): 339–368
Denis Vidal 366
Therefore is it difficult to conceive of a more total reversal in perspective than Lévi-
Strauss’ when he wrote in a scandalous conclusion that “the emergence of sym-
bolic thought must have required that women, like words, should be things that 
were exchanged” (Lévi-Strauss [1949] 1969: 496). By considering the subjects of the 
gift only as the objects of an exchange, the specificity of the notion of gift was lost 
entirely. In such a perspective, it is not surprising that the taking into account of 
notions such as charis, gratia, amor, and their equivalents in other cultures disap-
peared completely from anthropological considerations on alliance. Incidentally, 
knowing that Lévi-Strauss was a lover of figurative painting, and considering that 
his own work unknowingly transformed it into complex sets of abstract kinship 
schemes, we may wonder what he really thought of his personal contribution to the 
iconography of the three Graces.
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Les trois Grâces ou l’allégorie du don: Contribution à l’histoire d’une idée 
en anthropologie
Résumé : ‘L’ essai sur le don’ de Marcel Mauss est une des textes les plus fameux de 
toute l’anthropologie ; certainement aussi un de ceux qui ont suscité les débats les 
plus nombreux et les plus variés dans cette discipline. Paradoxalement, ces débats 
ont assez peu porté sur la tradition culturelle dans laquelle ce texte s’inscrivait de 
manière manifeste. Je voudrais montrer ainsi que les réflexions de Marcel Mauss 
sur le don prolongent, tout en le modifiant, un très ancien courant de réflexion sur 
le don, basé sur un ensemble de notions apparentées ayant joué un rôle crucial dans 
la culture européenne : charis, gratia, grâce. Je voudrais montrer aussi, le rôle cen-
tral joué dans ce même contexte par une allégorie et par un thème iconographique 
qui s’est perpétué pratiquement sans discontinuer depuis la Grèce archaîque : celui 
des Trois Grâces.
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